Course Intel analysis 101

Posted on Sunday July 26th, 2020 @ 6:53pm by Lieutenant Commander T'Pri
Edited on on Sunday July 26th, 2020 @ 7:38pm

1,638 words; about a 8 minute read

Mission: S1-A1-Ep. 1: Spectrophobia
Location: Class room 1B
Timeline: 239407.26

[On]

T'Pri Strode into the classroom

I am Lt. T'Pri I will be tour instructor for Intelligence analysis 201

Intelligence analysis is the application of individual and collective cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses within a secret socio-cultural context. The descriptions are drawn from what may only be available in the form of deliberately deceptive information; the analyst must correlate the similarities among deceptions and extract a common truth. Although its practice is found in its purest form inside intelligence agencies, its methods are also applicable in fields such as business intelligence or competitive intelligence.

Intelligence analysis is a way of reducing the ambiguity of highly ambiguous situations. Many analysts prefer the middle-of-the-road explanation, rejecting high or low probability explanations. Analysts may use their own standard of proportionality as to the risk acceptance of the opponent, rejecting that the opponent may take an extreme risk to achieve what the analyst regards as a minor gain. Above all, the analyst must avoid the special cognitive traps for intelligence analysis projecting what she or he wants the opponent to think, and using available information to justify that conclusion. To assume that one's enemies try to confuse is not being paranoid but realistic, especially in the areas of intelligence cycle security and its sub-discipline counterintelligence. During Dominion War the Federation word for counterintelligence art was radio game—not a game in the sense of playing fields, but something that draws from game theory and seeks to confuse one's opponents.

Obviously, a set of problem-solving talents are essential for analysts. Since the other side may be hiding their intention, the analyst must be tolerant of ambiguity, of false leads, and of partial information far more fragmentary than faces the experimental scientist. According to Star Fleet Intelligence, in an experiment in which analyst behavior was studied, the process is one of incremental refinement: "with test subjects in the experiment demonstrating that initial exposure to blurred stimuli interferes with accurate perception even after more and better information becomes available...the experiment suggests that an analyst who starts observing a potential problem situation at an early and unclear stage is at a disadvantage as compared with others, such as policymakers, whose first exposure may come at a later stage when more and better information is available."

The receipt of information in small increments over time also facilitates assimilation of this information into the analyst's existing views. No one item of information may be sufficient to prompt the analyst to change a previous view. The cumulative message inherent in many pieces of information may be significant but is attenuated when this information is not examined as a whole.

The problem of incremental analysis—especially as it applies to the current intelligence process—was also at work in the period preceding hostilities. Analysts, according to their own accounts, were often proceeding on the basis of the day's take, hastily comparing it with material received the previous day. They then produced in 'assembly line fashion' items which may have reflected perceptive intuition but which [did not] accrue from a systematic consideration of an accumulated body of integrated evidence.
Writers on analysis have suggested reasons why analysts come to incorrect conclusions, by falling into cognitive traps for intelligence analysis (Which we will discuss later). Without falling into the trap of avoiding decisions by wanting more information, analysts also need to recognize that they always can learn more about the opponent.

The body of specific methods for intelligence analysis is generally referred to as analytic tradecraft. The academic disciplines examining the art and science of intelligence analysis are most routinely referred to as "Intelligence Studies", and exemplified by institutions such as the Joint Military Intelligence College, University of Andoria Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (Security and Intelligence Studies major). The goal of the Analytic Tradecraft Notes of the Starfleet's Directorate of Intelligence (SDI) include the
Pursuit of expertise in analytic tradecraft is a central element of this plan. Our tradecraft enables analysts to provide "value-added" to consumers of intelligence by ensuring:

• Dedication to objectivity – tough-minded evaluation of information and explicit defense of judgments – which enhances our credibility with consumers dealing with complex and sensitive policy issues.

• Delivery of our products to the right people in time to be useful in their decision-making, and using feedback and tasking from them to drive the collection of the basic intelligence that we need to produce our analysis.

Analytic tradecraft skills also serve as "force multipliers", helping us provide top-quality analysis:

• The feedback our customers give us on our customized analysis clarifies for the analyst what questions most need answering.

• Employing rules for evaluating information and making judgments helps analysts manage the deluge of information, discern trends, and identify attempts at deception.

• Tradecraft standards can be used to iron out differences among experts who have complementary substantive specialties. Their interaction enhances teamwork, which allows the [Directorate of Intelligence] to be more productive.

Setting goals for an intelligence analysis:

Stating the objective from the consumer's standpoint is an excellent starting point for goal-setting:

Ambassador Robert D. Fox ... seized the attention of the class of some 30 [intelligence community managers] by asserting that as a policy official he never read ... analytic papers. Why? "Because they were non-adhesive." As Fox explained, they were written by people who did not know what he was trying to do and, so, could not help him get it done: "When I was working at State on Europan affairs, for example, on certain issues I was the Secretary of State. DI analysts did not know that—that I was one of a handful of key decision makers on some very important matters."
More charitably, he now characterizes his early periods of service at the SFC Staff and in State Department bureaus as ones of "mutual ignorance"
"DI analysts did not have the foggiest notion of what I did; and I did not have a clue as to what they could or should do."]
Fox explained how he used his time efficiently, which rarely involved reading general SIA reports. "I read a lot. Much of it was press. You have to know how issues are coming across politically to get your job done. Also, cables from overseas for preparing agendas for meetings and sending and receiving messages from my counterparts in foreign governments. Countless versions of policy drafts from those competing for the Councils blessing. And dozens of phone calls. Many are a waste of time but have to be answered, again, for policy and political reasons.
"One more minute, please, on what I did not find useful. This is important. My job description called for me to help prepare the President for making policy decisions, including at meetings with foreign counterparts and other officials...Do you think that after I have spent long weeks shaping the agenda, I have to be told a day or two before the Klingon foreign minister visits Europa why he is coming?"

Be bold and honest

Weasel-wording is problematic in intelligence analysis; still, some things truly are uncertain. Arguably, when uncertainties are given with probabilities or at least some quantification of likelihood, they become less a case of weasel wording and more a case of reflecting reality as it is best understood.
While a good analyst must be able to consider, thoughtfully, alternative viewpoints, an analyst must be willing to stand by his or her position. This is especially important in specialized areas, when the analyst may be the only one that reads every field report, every technical observation on a subject.

"Believe in your own professional judgments. Always be willing to listen to alternative conclusions or other points of view, but stand your ground if you really believe the intelligence supports a certain conclusion. Just because someone is your boss, is a higher grade, or has been around longer than you does not mean he or she knows more about your account than you do. You are the one who reads the traffic every day and who studies the issue. At the same time, Watanabe observes, "It is better to be mistaken than wrong". Not willing to be wrong is also a disease of the highest policymaker levels, and why there needs to be a delicately balanced relationship, built of trust, between a policymaker and his closest intelligence advisors.

"Being an intelligence analyst is not a popularity contest...But your job is to pursue the truth. I recall a colleague who forwarded an analysis that called into question the wisdom behind several new Federation weapon systems. This analysis caused criticism of the SIA, of his office, and of himself. He stood his ground, however; the Agency supported him, and eventually he was proven right. He did not make a lot of friends, but he did his job.

Intelligence analysts are expected to give policymakers' opinions both support and reality checks. The most effective products have several common features:

• Opportunities and dangers for interests of the analyst's country, especially unexpected developments that may require a reaction.
• Motives, objectives, strengths, and vulnerabilities of adversaries, allies, and other actors.
• Direct and indirect sources of friendly parties' leverage on foreign players and issues.
• Tactical alternatives for advancing stated national policy goals.

Reality checking is not to be underestimated. In Dominion War, the Allies launched an offensive against a target system that they really did not understand: the Shipyards of the Chintaka system. Their rationale to attack ("if the enemy apparently valued it, then it must be worth attacking") may have been rational when there were large numbers of starships and fighters, but it might not be applicable to current situations, at least not until analysts rule out the possibility of the target system being a decoy. If the threat is real, then it might be warranted to defer attack until a massive one can be delivered.

Questions?

[OFF]

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